In Part I we looked at the history of labor unions in baseball, and the changes that Marvin MIller wrought in a short team as the president of the Major League Baseball Player's Association. Today, we see how Curt Flood paved the road for the eventual creation of free agency, and how Miller won this right for the players.

Curt Flood was 31 years old after the 1969 season ended. Flood was an established star for the St. Louis Cardinals, having hit .285 in 1969, after hitting .301 and .335 in the previous two seasons. After the 1969, season, however, to his surprise and dismay, the Cardinals traded Flood to the Philadelphia Phillies.

Flood had been with the Cardinals throughout his entire career and was upset at having to play for  Philadelphia. Furthermore Flood was angry at the general idea that he had no control over where he played. He decided to challenge the Reserve Clause, and he won the support of the newly-strong Union. On Christmas Eve in 1969 Flood wrote to Commissioner Kuhn, saying “I do not feel that I am a piece of property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes.” Kuhn responded respectfully, saying that the Reserve Clause was part of the CBA and Flood had agreed to it every year of his 12-year career.

Flood sued the commissioner and owners for $1 million, claiming that his rights were violated under antitrust laws. In short, Flood claimed that in any other business a worker who’s services were in demand had some choice over where to work. Owners understood that baseball’s antitrust exemption was on shaky ground, but they weren’t particularly worried, assuming that the Court wouldn’t even hear the case (after all, they had reaffirmed the exemption less than 20 years prior – more on the origins of baseball’s antitrust exemption next week).

However, to many peoples’ surprise, the Court did agree to hear Flood’s case. And, in an even bigger surprise, the Court (reluctantly) upheld the precedent; in other words, Flood’s claim was denied. However, the arguments used in the case against Flood by the owners came back to haunt them, as they were forced to collectively bargain the Reserve Clause and eventually agreed to arbitration (as discussed in part I), a huge coup for Miller and the players.

At the end of the 1972 season, the Reserve Clause was still a powerful force. While players’ salaries were as high as they had ever been, thanks to arbitration (and the threat of arbitration), players were still tied to their team for as long as the team wanted, thereby decreasing their earnings potential. Furthermore, baseball was awash with cash. The sport had expanded considerably in the 1950s and 1960s, and the advent of television provided another huge stream of revenue. The economy was growing, and baseball was growing as well. However, in 1973, as a direct result of bargaining that took place due to Curt Flood’s lawsuit, baseball introduced salary arbitration.

Miller’s hunch about arbitration being beneficial for players soon paid off. Players were essentially starting with nothing – owners had had all of the power throughout baseball’s existence. Players won over half of the salary cases that went to arbitration, in large part because salaries before arbitration were so far skewed against the players. Additionally, simply having arbitration at the players’ disposal caused owners to pay them more money, in hopes of avoiding arbitration altogether.

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UPDATE: Part II of this article can be found here.

Last week we looked at the History of the American and National leagues in two parts (part I, part II). This week we will look at the history of labor unions in baseball, and focus on the impact that Marvin Miller had on the game. We will examine the significance of the Reserve Clause, and look at how Marvin Miller won concessions from the owners and eventually won the right for players to become free agents.

For much of baseball’s history, players were contractually bound to their teams for life, and were subject to be paid whatever the team decided.  It wasn’t until Marvin Miller came along that players were able to form into any kind of cohesive Union with any sort of power.

In 1890, baseball players formed the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players. In 1900, they formed the Players’ Protective Association. In 1910 they formed the Fraternity of Professional Baseball Players of America. And in 1946 they formed the American Baseball Guild. But none of these unions had any lasting power whatsoever.

You see, since baseball’s inception, players have been bound to the team for which they play. As baseball quickly became a profitable business rather than a leisure-time activity, owners sought to ensure that they received the bulk of the profits. Thus, they instituted the “Reserve Clause” – every baseball player was contractually obligated – or “reserved” – to his team unless the team no longer wanted him (either by trading him or releasing him). Players had no say in where they played (unless they were free agents – but even then, the demand for their services was likely to be low, since they could only become free agents upon their release), and no say over their salary. Owners could pay their players whatever they liked, and the players couldn’t do anything about it.

Owners guarded the Reserve Clause with dogged determination, as it was the ticket to maximum profits. So long as players had no leverage over their salaries, owners could – and often did – keep most of the profits for themselves. One of the most notoriously cheap owners, White Sox owner Charles Comiskey, saw his 1919 White Sox team throw the World Series in order to earn money, probably a byproduct of Comiskey’s unwillingness to pay his team even average wages.

Still, the players remained (mostly) happy, as they were making money by playing baseball. And the owners naturally paid stars more than they paid scrubs, thereby keeping the stars happy. And if the stars are happy, everyone’s happy – the scrubs had leverage at all, considering that they were often easily replaceable. 

Owners’ fervent protection of the reserve clause undergirded their attempts to keep their monopoly intact. Any third major league could compete for players by offering them higher salaries, which the owners simply couldn’t tolerate, as competition for players meant less money in their pockets - hence their efforts to drive leagues like the Federal League and Continental League into the ground.

That would all change beginning in 1953, when the best attempt at forming a union began: the Major League Baseball Players Association.

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Let’s ask the numbers. 

Damon debuted in the majors at age 21, while Ellsbury’s debut came at age 23. This alone should tell you something about the two players: better players tend to make it to the majors sooner, although there are very many exceptions. Maybe Ellsbury is an exception.

At age 21, Johnny Damon demolished double-A pitching, to the tune of .343/.434/.534. He earned a call to the majors and posted a .765 OPS in 188 at bats. Jacoby Ellsbury, at age 21, was in his last year at Oregon State, and also spent some time in short season ball with the Red Sox. 

At age 22, Damon was a full-time outfielder, hitting a paltry .271/.313/.368 with 6 homers in 145 games. At the same age, Ellsbury split time between high-A and double-A, putting together a combined line of .303/.382/.425 with seven homers in 111 games.

By age 23, Damon was showing signs of improvement, hitting .275/.338/.386 with 8 homers. Ellsbury, meanwhile, tore through double-A and triple-A (hitting .323/.387/.424 along the way), and finished the season with the Red Sox, where he hit .298/.360/.380 and played an important part in their championship season. It seems that, by age 23, Ellsbury had “caught” Damon in terms of development. Age 24 is where it gets particularly interesting. 

At 24 years old, Damon played his third straight full season (he played in 161 games), and he once again showed improvement – particularly in the power department. Damon hit .277/.339/.439 with 18 homers and 30 doubles, a huge improvement over his power numbers of the previous two seasons. Ellsbury’s age-24 season was in 2008, and he hit .280/.336/.394. Furthermore, the two players’ plate discipline was remarkably similar (as it had been in the minors, too): Damon drew walks in 8.3% of his plate appearances and struck out in 13.1%; Ellsbury walked in 6.9% and struck out in 14.4%.

After age 24, Damon transformed his game. In his age-25 season he hit .307/.377/.477 and walked 17 times more than he struck out. That began an impressive run during which his OBP was below .350 only twice through this year, and he had six seasons of at least 14 homers (not to mention at least 30 doubles in every season except 2007 and 2008).  

What does this mean for Jacoby Ellsubry? Well, from a purely statistical point of view (and I recognize that there are many other factors to take into consideration – notably, the size/strength of these two players), Damon’s age-24 season was very similar to Ellsbury’s season. The difference, of course, is the power: Damon slugged 45 points higher than Ellsbury, and walked (slightly) more while striking out (slightly) less.

While 45 points of slugging percentage may not seem like a big deal – especially for players whose games rely more on plate discipline and speed – I posit that the slugging difference between Damon and Ellsbury is hugely important.

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In Part I on Tuesday, we looked at the early days of the AL and NL, as well as baseball's expansion into California. Today, we pick up where we left off, with the story of a man named Bud.

Bud Selig and the Seattle Pilots

The Seattle Pilots struggled in their first year, and perhaps are best known for the book written by Jim Bouton, a former Pilots pitcher, entitled “Ball Four.” The Pilots struggles were news to the ears of Milwaukee businessman Bud Selig.

Selig was a minority owner of the Milwaukee Braves, who were very successful in the late 1950s, having won the World Series in 1957 and gotten back to it (and lost) in 1958. Selig was very aware of the fact that Milwaukee was a small market – a fact that became increasingly important as television expanded. Therefore, Selig created “Teams Inc.,” a company designed to promote local control of the Braves franchise. He successfully staved off a move in 1964, but eventually lost the Braves to Atlanta in 1965. From the moment the Braves moved south, Selig began a quest to bring another team to Milwaukee.

Selig renamed Teams Inc. “Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club Inc.,” an homage to the original Milwaukee Brewers team of 1901. In 1968, Selig’s group enticed the Chicago White Sox to agree to play nine “home” games in Milwaukee in order to demonstrate that Milwaukee was still a viable market for baseball. The games were a rousing success: those nine games drew 264,297 fans, while the other 58 White Sox home games drew 539,478 – just over twice the amount of people that saw only nine games in Milwaukee.

Selig hoped that these staggering numbers would prompt the owners to give Milwaukee an expansion team to replace the Braves in 1969; however, the owners decided to further expand baseball’s market, awarding teams to Canada, the Pacific Northwest, Southern California, and Kansas City. After failing to secure an expansion team, Selig turned his efforts once again towards relocating an existing franchise. After a failed attempt to move the Chicago White Sox north, he set his sights on the Seattle Pilots, who drew tiny crowds throughout the 1969 season.

The Pilots originally weren’t supposed to begin playing until 1971, but that date was moved up to 1969 thanks to Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, who wanted the expansion team in Kansas City to begin in 1969 as well. The Pilots also had to pay the Pacific Coast League – a minor league circuit - $1 million as compensation for the loss of one of its most successful franchises, which had been located in Seattle.

The Pilots, unsurprisingly, were not a good team in their inaugural season, but their stadium was even worse. Although it was originally one of the best minor league stadiums, Sick’s Stadium – home of the Seattle Pilots – had become old by 1969, and renovations weren’t made in time for the beginning of the season. Only 17000 seats were usable at the beginning, and when additional seats were added, many had obstructed views. Attendance was so poor that by the end of the 1969 season, the Pilots were nearly broke.

Pilots owner Dewey Soriano met in secret with Bud Selig for over a month at the end of the season. During game one of the World Series, Soriano agreed to sell the franchise to Selig, who planned on moving it to Milwaukee and re-naming it the Brewers. However, when the deal was made public it was met with resistance from Washington’s senators, who wanted Soriano to find a local buyer for the franchise. In January of 1970, Westin Hotels owner Eddie Carlson put together a non-profit group to buy the franchise; however, the other owners shot this idea down, in fear that it would devalue other franchises.

The Pilots reported to spring training in 1970 unsure of where they would be playing during the season. Baseball’s owners had agreed to let Selig buy the team and move it to Milwaukee, but the state of Washington received a court order on March 17 to stop the sale. Soriano filed for bankruptcy, claiming that he was not able to pay the players and staff. Had the team been 10 days late with payment, all of the players would have been declared free agents. Rather than let this happen, Federal Bankruptcy Referee Sidney Volinn declared the Pilots bankrupt on April 1 – a mere six days before opening day. The Pilots equipment truck had left their spring training site in Arizona days earlier, unsure of what city to drive to. It stopped in Provo, Utah, and awaited word of what city it should take the equipment to. On April 1, the truck headed northeast to Milwaukee. Bud Selig had his new team.

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In response to the Yankees acquiring Texeira (Kanekoa, that is), the Red Sox acquired Ramirez…Ramon Ramirez.

The Red Sox sent Coco Crisp to the Royals for Ramon Ramirez, in a trade that makes sense on the surface for both teams. This trade is most interesting for the what it says about the Red Sox’s opinion of Jacoby Ellsbury, and the Royals’s misguided team philosophy. 

First, let’s discuss the players. Crisp came to the Red Sox in a blockbuster deal centered around Andy Marte (ironically, Kelly Shoppach is now the most valuable person traded in that 6-player deal). Crisp was an offensive disappointment in Boston in his first two years, however, he did play excellent defense in 2007. In 2008 his defense slipped somewhat, but his offense rebounded a little as well, as he hit .283/.344/.407. The power that allowed him to slug .465 for the Indians in 2004 appears to be gone, but it’s an excellent sign that Crisp was able to get his OBP back up over .340.

Ramon Ramirez throws a 92-93 MPH fastball, as well as a slider and changeup. Even though he throws a changeup, lefties have been much more effective against Ramirez than righties – lefties have posted an OPS almost 200 points higher. However, Ramirez is not a complete ROOGY – even though lefties have hit better than righties, they’ve still only managed a .758 OPS against Ramirez. 

In his career, Ramirez has struck out 8.39 batters per nine and walked 3.68. He’s allowed exactly the same number of ground balls as fly balls (41.8%), although he allowed 10% more grounders than fly balls last year. Ramirez is still young and throws hard, but probably walks too many to be trusted in the most important situations.

This deal looks like it’s simply an above-average 4^th outfielder in exchange for a solid reliever. Crisp may end up being a decent starting center fielder, and Ramirez may end up being a decent set-up man. On the surface, I think this trade is very fair. But let’s look at what it says about each team.

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RJ’s post about the next .400 hitter got me thinking – are we ever going to see another 70 home run hitter?

Certainly, hitting 70 homers is quite difficult - only two players have ever done this, and only two players even managed 40 homers in 2008. But one player comes to mind as having perhaps the most reasonable chance to smack 70 homers: Rangers slugger Chris Davis. 

Let’s take a look at Chris Davis, and see what would have to happen for this young star-in-the-making to reach the 70 homer milestone. It would take quite the confluence of events (this formula can generally be applied to other hitters, too).

Here are some necessary steps:

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Baseball’s history is rich and complex, full of colorful characters, timeless moments and tremendous achievements. It is the story of racism and redemption, doctored balls and labor strikes, players and owners, victory and defeat. Just like the sport itself, baseball’s history has been both unpredictable and bound by cause-and-effect.

In order to appreciate where the sport of baseball is in the year 2008, we need to understand appreciate the past. In the coming weeks, I will provide a cursory overview of various aspects of baseball’s history, starting today with Expansion, Part I.

At the end of this series, I will provide some suggestions for books to read if you are interested. These posts will barely scratch the surface of what happened and why, and it behooves anyone truly interested in America’s national past time to dig into more depth.

NOTE: Part II can be found here.

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I lauded Brian Cashman for stealing Nick Swisher from the White Sox. I believe Swisher is an excellent candidate to bounce back from his poor 2008 season, and even if he doesn’t, Cashman didn’t give up anything of real value. It’s a no-risk, potentially-high reward move.

But this move becomes a lot less smart if the Yankees choose not to pursue Mark Teixeira, as a recent report suggested. Much of Swisher’s value is in his versatility – he can play first base and all three outfield positions. Given the state of flux that the Yankees outfield is in, this is quite valuable. However, the Yankees shouldn’t simply plug Swisher into first base and ignore Teixeira.

Last year, the Yankees had two main problems: offense and defense. Neither is likely to improve much in 2009, due to the age and composition of the Yankees roster – namely, many of their players are on the wrong side of age 30. That doesn’t mean that players like Jeter or Arod aren’t going to be good, it just means they’re unlikely to improve, and it’s possible that they’ll decline (Jeter’s decline has already begun). For all of the talk about the vaunted Yankee offense, they scored fewer runs than a Pronk-less Cleveland Indians team in 2008. Yes, Robinson Cano is likely to improve and Jorge Posada will be back, but they will also lose Jason Giambi and perhaps Bobby Abreu; Yankees offense isn’t likely to be among the best in the league. 

Furthermore, their defense last year was terrible – they ranked 25^th in Park Adjusted Defensive Efficiency (PADE). But they don’t really have many places where they can improve their defense: Jeter and Cano are entrenched at SS and 2B, while the outfield is a mess and may be even worse if Damon plays center field most of the time and/or Abreu is re-signed.

Simply stated, the Yankees need help on both offense and defense, and they don’t have many places on their team in which they can upgrade. However, they have an open position at first base, and Mark Teixeira would provide a huge upgrade, both on offense and defense.

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Flash back to last offseason. Kenny Williams traded Fautino De Los Santos, Ryan Sweeney, and Gio Gonzalez to Oakland for Nick Swisher – basically killing what was an already-barren farm system. It wasn’t a terrible trade at the time – personally, I didn’t mind the move but thought it was odd timing, considering that I didn’t think the White Sox would compete in 2008.

But then Swisher went and hit .219/.332/.410 and fell out of favor with Ozzie Guillen, riding the pine in favor of Dewayne Wise towards the end of the season. And now, Swisher has been dealt to the Yankees (along with minor leaguer Kanekoa Texeira) in exchange for Wilson Betemit, Jeffrey Marquez, and Jhonny Nunez.

Let’s start with what the White Sox received. Wilson Betemit is a pretty good player, with a career line of .260/.325/.437 and 42 homers in 1098 at bats. He has played every infield position over the last few years – although he hasn’t played any of them particularly well. Betemit will be 27 years old next year and will be eligible for arbitration for the next two years. Given his versatility and pop, he’s a solid bench player; however, he’s likely to be stretched if given the opportunity to play every day. He may be adequate at third base, sharing time with Josh Fields next season. However, that is probably Betemit’s ceiling.

Marquez is a ground ball machine who stopped getting as many grounders at triple-A this year. This bodes very poorly for him, considering he neither walks few enough nor strikes out enough batters to survive without excellent ground ball rates. In triple-A, Marquez induced grounders on 45% of his balls in play, and posted a 33/24 K/BB ratio in 80 innings. As you might imagine, this led to a less-than-impressive 6.67 tRA, and a tRA+ of 62. In triple-A.

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Defense is important. While we can quibble about the best ways to understand and evaluate individual defense (although Dan and Sky have done an excellent job), it’s hard to argue with Park Adjusted Defensive Efficiency (PADE) as an accurate measure of a team’s overall defense.

With that in mind, let’s take a look at team defense over the last five years. What follows below is a simple average of PADE ranking for each of the last five years, with comments following.

Analysis/thoughts after the jump.

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