FanPost

Is it really strategy or just rote?

With Adam Wainwright tearing his Achilles tendon and Max Scherzer declaring war on having to hit (after hurting his thumb), the DH debate is back in full force. I know what you are thinking – "not another DH article." Well, relax; this isn’t another DH article. But, since I brought it up (and before I get into what I really want to talk about), here’s what I think on the issue.

I think pitchers should have to hit in all leagues. But, since that’s never going to happen, I want the DH in the NL. Not because pitchers might get injured while hitting and not because they’re almost universally bad hitters. It’s because if I have to watch one more freaking automatic sacrifice bunt by a pitcher murder a potentially large rally, I’m going to throw my shoes at the managers when they huddle at the plate before a game. For the life of me, I do not understand all of the righteous, anti-DH, NL fans who claim the AL is boring, when in the NL we have to endure watching a pitcher bunt with two strikes, a man on second, and only one out. It’s enough to make you want to slit your throat with a tortilla chip just to see if your heart is still beating.

And, if you don’t hear the "excitement" argument, you can bet your right thumb that you’ll hear the "strategy" argument and that’s what I really want to talk about. Does the NL require more strategy than the AL? DH haters sure seem to think so because, apparently, the double switch is some sort of voodoo wizardry to them. I think what they really mean is that it’s more difficult to manage in the NL, but seriously, are the decisions an NL manager has to make any more difficult than those of his AL counterpart?

We all know that in the later innings of a game, the only difference between the two leagues is that an NL manager has to decide whether or not to pinch hit for his pitcher, which in nearly all cases, isn’t really a decision at all. There are plenty of variables weighing on that decision (which we’ll get to in a moment), but the strategy is dealing with that decision and that’s where the double switch comes into play. Folks – the double switch is not advanced physics. Heck, it’s not even Candyland. It’s just keeping the pinch hitter in the lineup and replacing the hitter who makes the third out of the inning (and whom that pinch hitter can field the same position as) with the pitcher. Using the Rockies as an example, if Drew Stubbs is the pinch hitter (batting ninth), and Charlie Blackmon makes the last out, Stubbs will go to center field the next inning and the new pitcher will occupy Blackmon’s spot in the lineup. Granted, it doesn’t have to work this way, since you might not remove Troy Tulowitzki if he makes the last out, but the principle doesn’t change; you’d just replace the guy right before Tulowitzki. I think we can all agree that it doesn’t take a degree from MIT to execute a double switch.

Any other decision is equal in both leagues. Both have to decide when to pinch hit and with who and both have to decide when to pull pitchers and who to replace them with. You could almost argue it’s easier to manage in the NL because having a pitcher in the lineup takes pinch hitting decisions away from the manager in almost every situation where it’s a question and makes bunting automatic for pitchers not named Madison Bumgarner when there are runners on with less than two outs. Plus, with advanced metrics, scouting reports, and favorable matchups, the decision becomes nothing more than a spreadsheet lookup. Modern bullpens have also helped eliminate critical thinking because relief pitchers have gotten more expensive and specialized and using them is job security (i.e. playing it safe) for the manager.

But the best way to try to answer the question of strategic difficulty is through an example and the Rockies just happened to have provided a nearly ideal situation in their game against the Diamondbacks Monday (4/27/15) night. In the top of the sixth inning with a 5-2 lead and two outs, the Rockies had the bases loaded with Tyler Matzek coming to the plate. Additionally, Matzek had thrown only 79 pitches through five innings to that point, would be facing the 5-6-7 hitters in the bottom of the sixth inning, and the Rockies need 6-inning starts the way a Kardashian needs a camera – desperately. And just to make things slightly more interesting, Matzek already had one hit on the day. From that information, the obvious answer is to let Matzek hit.

Furthermore, the possible pinch hitters at Weiss’ disposal were Drew Stubbs, Daniel Descalso, Nick Hundley, and Rafael Ynoa. Stubbs and Descalso are 3-for-45 combined on the season (all 3 hits are Descalso’s) and Hundley is the only backup catcher (thanks to Wilin Rosario’s demotion to AAA), so the only plausible pinch hitter this early in the game is the light-hitting rookie, Ynoa. After consideration, Weiss chose to stick with Matzek, seemingly for the pitching positives, and Matzek grounded out to end the inning. Coincidentally, Weiss had to pull Matzek after one pitch in the sixth inning because of leg cramps and Weiss’ decision not to pinch hit suddenly became a lost opportunity. Luckily, the Rockies held on to win the game 5-4, though did not score again.

Of course, there are more variables to this situation than just the in-game variables. I happened to catch this game in the car and the commentators stated that had this happened much later in the season, Matzek would have been pinch hit for for sure, to which I’d argue, a win’s a win; time of season shouldn’t matter. I think the one variable Weiss might have considered more heavily was that Matzek probably wasn’t going to pitch the seventh inning no matter what, so why not go for the knockout by pinch hitting? Your answer: save the bullpen. My response: you’re only saving one inning at best and it’s April; go for the win. Starters are more stretched out as the season gets deeper, so bullpen burn shouldn’t be a huge concern (yes, I know we’re talking about the Rockies here) early on. But, I digress.

Getting back to my question, what if this exact situation (minus the pitcher of course) had occurred between two AL teams? Looking through AL rosters, there’s no shortage of teams with terrible everyday hitters in the nine hole, including the Mariners. Like the Rockies, the Mariners have a middling record and can’t afford to give any games away if they want to stay in contention. The Mariners’ catcher and ninth batter (at least on that same Monday night) is Mike Zunino, who is currently sporting a slash of .129/.214/.242. Isn’t the decision to pinch hit for Zunino just as difficult (or strategic, if you want to misuse the word) as Weiss’ decision was? Lloyd McClendon (Seattle’s manager) has to decide whether or not to pinch hit for a professional hitter from a bench of guys who aren’t exactly tearing the cover off the ball (Willie Bloomquist, Justin Ruggiano, Rickie Weeks, Jesus Sucre), all to maximize his team’s chance of winning. Again, the only difference is the pitching variable, but that pitching variable is rarely ever relevant. With the modern bullpen, chances are really good that McClendon’s starter isn’t pitching into the seventh either, so he’s going to be juggling his bullpen just as much as Weiss, and might even do a double switch (which do happen in the AL as well). The big difference is that McClendon doesn’t have the pitcher’s spot in the lineup to make his decision for him.

Maybe Weiss made the right decision and maybe he didn’t, but my point is this – with the evolution of the bullpen, pitch counts, platoon splits leading to deeper benches, and advanced metrics, managers in both leagues have the same level of difficulty when making decisions, except AL managers aren’t auto-bunting at least once a game. Now, please pass the nachos.

Eat. Drink. Be Merry. But the above FanPost does not necessarily reflect the attitudes, opinions, or views of Purple Row's staff (unless, of course, it's written by the staff [and even then, it still might not]).

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